We present data supporting the notion that subjects distort monotonically subgame perfect equilibrium demands in two-person discount bargaining games, where, in addition to the traditional offer counter-offer sequence of moves, a player who rejects an offer may either be forced out of the bargaining or be given the option to opt out. Subjects also exhibit behavioral adaptivity-learning from past demands in a search for the highest acceptable demand. These reuslts are consistent with previous experimental evidence for these types of games, but stand in sharp contrast to those obtained in discount bargaining where side options are not available. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78.
INTRODUCTION
The seminal paper by Rubinstein (1982) has inspired several experiments on two-person sequential bargaining in games presented in extensive function form. In most, though not all, of these experiments, the bargaining game is played with complete information and alternating offers. The question underlying this research is whether or to what extent subgame perfect equilibrium accounts for behavior.
Most of the experiments have implemented an explicit finite horizon version of the extensive function form game (Ståhl, 1972) in which time is discrete and the two players, named 1 and 2, alternate in offering a partition of a given sum ("pie") . Time is discounted with discount rates which may or may not differ from one player to another. The game continues until one of the players accepts an offer or the finite horizon is reached, which ever occurs first. In this case, subgame perfect equilibrium (S P E) is derived by backward induction (dynamic programming) in a rather obvious manner. The general conjecture from several carefully controlled studies (see Ochs and Roth, 1989 , for a review) is that bargaining behavior in this paradigm is not accounted for by the backward induction algorithm. It is not entirely clear what to make of this conclusion. It is based on a set of experiments which seem to adopt the view that a bargaining game is a rigid description of the "physical rules of the world" as specified in detail by the instructions given to the players. But if we adopt the point of view that a game is not a rigid description of these rules, as specified by the experimenter, "then a game theoretic model should include only those factors which are perceived by the players to be relevant" (Rubinstein, 1991, p. 919) . Given this perspective, modeling requires, in addition to intuition, common sense, and recognition of individual differences, empirical data about how different players represent the bargaining situation and the cognitive factors which enter into the players' strategic considerations. We find no such work in the experimental investigation of two-person bargaining in extensive function form. 1 In contrast, work along these lines has been reported recently in the area of individual choice under uncertainty. For example, Segal (1987) and more recently Bernasconi and Loomes (1992) have suggested how the Ellsberg paradox might be explained in terms of individual agents mentally representing the decision problem presented to them as one of several alternative two-or three-stage lotteries, which they are assumed to evaluate according to some nonexpected utility model. Another earlier example is the work of Maschler (1963) on the power of a coalition, which suggests that the characteristic function representation does not adequately and accurately portray the players' perception of the power of coalitions in coalitional form games (Kahan and Rapoport, 1984) .
A second approach to experimental investigation of two-person sequential bargaining, which complements rather than negates the approach outlined above, is to extend, modify, or enrich the experimental paradigm in an attempt to delineate the conditions in which the S P E is potentially useful as a descriptive model. Early attempts to study the effects of learning on the bargaining outcomes are subsumed under this approach. Binmore et al. (1985) showed that in a two-period game experienced subjects approximated the S P E partition rather closely. However, both Neelin et al. (1988) and Ochs and Roth (1989) have shown that experience is not sufficient when exploring finite-horizon games with more than two periods. Disappointment with the behavior displayed in finite-horizon games has been such that several investigators have tried to teach gamesmanship to their subjects (Spiegel et al., 1990; Harrison and McCabe, 1992) . The generalizability of the findings from these latter experiments is severely limited, as life rarely provides such structured learning experiences.
Another modification, possibly a simplification, of the experimental paradigm is accomplished by removing the restriction that the number of periods during which agreement must be reached is finite. Support for this modification is provided by Rubinstein, who argued that there is only a partial correspondence between the real length of a repeated game (which is specified clearly by the instructions) and the choice of a model to analyze it. "Even short games may be better analyzed as infinite horizon games" (Rubinstein, 1991, p. 918) , because they may better capture the players' method of reasoning. In accordance with this suggestion, Weg et al. (1990) tested an infinite-horizon version of the twoperson bargaining game. Nonetheless, they too found no support for the S P E solution.
TWO-PERSON BARGAINING WITH OUTSIDE OPTIONS
Yet a third attempt to extend the sequential bargaining paradigm in a different direction in search of conditions which may be favorable to the S P E solution has been reported in two studies by Binmore et al. (1989 Binmore et al. ( , 1991 . Because these two studies are most relevant to our experiment, we describe them in some detail. Both experiments introduced a limited version of a bargaining scheme reported in Sutton (1986) which is presented in generic form in Fig. 1 .
In this scheme, a quit move is conditionally available to a player, contingent on the occurrence of a random event E with known probability, 2 immediately after he/she rejects an offer. Continuation of bargaining moves the clock one unit forward thus producing further discounting (by δ) of all payoffs. If the game terminates without the players reaching an agreement, which means that one of the players quit, each player consumes her (known) side value. This twoperson bargaining game is said to have voluntary (forced) side values if upon the occurrence of the random event the rejecting player can choose (is forced) to quit. Binmore et al. (1989) reported an experiment in which the pie was worth 7 pounds sterling, the voluntary side values, assigned only to player 2 and always accessible, were worth 0, 2, or 4 pounds, and the common discount rate was 0.9. FIG. 1. A tree of a normalized V game, modulo player 1 in a position to offer. Ownership of nodes is designated by player's number. Moves are classified as A, accepts offer; R, rejects offer; Q, quits offer upon occurence of E; O, proposes to counter offer upon occurrence of E; x (t) , demands x (t) ∈ [0, 1] at period t. Increments of time are pointed in appropriate nodes and attached to terminal nodes are δ t discounted payoff vectors. A tree for a F game is obtained from a V diagram by clipping all subpaths starting with an O move.
The results showed that player 2's side value had an effect. When it was less than half the pie (i.e., 0 or 2), there was a cluster of games where player 1's first demand was about 50% of the pie. But when player 2's side value was 4 pounds, there was a cluster of games where player 1's first demand was only 43% of the pie: player 2 was offered her guaranteed side value but no more. These results support the S P E predictions that the outside options will be irrelevant to the final agreement unless the deal assigns one of the bargainers less than he/she can get elsewhere, and are in contrast to the Nash bargaining solution. The latter implies even splitting of the remaining pie after player 2 is given her guaranteed side value (split-the-difference, STD, rule), when the discount rate is close to unity.
In a subsequent study, Binmore et al. (1991) compared behavior in a similar bargaining game with both forms of side value-voluntary and forced. In both of these forms, player 1 had the same fixed side value of 4% of the pie. In contrast, player 2 was assigned 36 or 64% of the pie, depending on the game. In games with voluntary side value the common discount rate was 0.9 and the side value was always accessible. The forced side value condition did not discount shares of the pie. Instead, it implemented a probability of 0.1 that the game would terminate after an offer was rejected, in a similar manner to the study by Zwick et al. (1992) . The theoretical difference between the voluntary and forced termination conditions with the chosen parameters reflects two modes of sharing and seems to be supported by the experimental results. The voluntary termination condition has already been tested by Binmore et al. (1989) , and the forced termination condition demonstrates that the split-the-difference rule can be forced on players in an appropriate scenario.
Several methodological issues blur the interpretation of the results of Binmore et al. (1991) . First, notice that the voluntary/forced dichotomy is confounded with the discount rate: the source for these positive results is not uniquely identifiable in this design. Whether subjects respond to the different but normatively equivalent methods of inducing impatience, to the interpretation of breakdown as voluntary vs forced, or to both is not clear. Of course, if one is interested only in whether subjects adhere to fairness/focal theories vs strategic considerations then this weakness is irrelevant. The similarity of results reported by Weg et al. (1990) and Zwick et al. (1992) add to this claim of irrelevancy. But if one wants to identify sources of S P E conforming behavior the distinction becomes important.
Second, by using a high discount factor in the voluntary side values condition and a small equivalent risk of imposed breakdown in the forced side values condition, strategically optimal outcomes differ only slightly from those resulting in the corresponding limiting cases when the discount factors and risk approach the extreme values of 1 and 0, respectively. In these extreme cases the S P E solutions are natural "focal points" formulated in everyday langauge as "splitthe-difference" for the forced side values case and "deal-me-out" (DMO) for the voluntary side values case. It is therefore not clear to what extent subjects' behavior favors strategically optimal play, as is intimated by Binmore et al. (1991) , or whether their behavior is biased toward the natural focal points created by the experimenters' choice of parameters.
Finally, Binmore et al. (1991) were unsuccessful in fully replicating their previous work (Binmore et al., 1989) under the voluntary side values regime and suggested that experience in this context appears to lead to some "unlearning." They concluded that more research is needed to explain the results. 
THE RICH ENVIRONMENT HYPOTHESIS
The interest in experimenting with bargaining games stems from the fact that bargaining is fundamental to economics and that it provides a natural testing ground to solution concepts of game theory. Thus, virtually all experiments in bargaining are driven by the expectation of rational behavior or of learning to behave in such a manner.
SPE for extensive form games with perfect information and common knowledge is the favorite solution concept. 4 The existence of a nonempty set of subgame perfect equilibria in an infinite bargaining depends heavily on the periodic pattern of who and when the demands are placed, when and what side values are consumed, and the stationarity of the utility functions of the players. The unique SPE demand is then determined by the discounting factors, the probability of accessing the outside option and its meaning (voluntary (V ) or forced (F) types), and the size of the outside options. These factors, in general, interact in a rather complicated manner in the determination of the SPE demands. We shall now see, for example, how the solution of a type F game can be approximated if we take a simplifying step: we posit a high discount factor common to both players. This imposes an aura of symmetry regarding time. Here, the probability of termination with side option looms high. High probability of termination 3 In Binmore et al. (1989) , player 1 had a null side value. However, subjects acting as player 1 "were not explicitly reminded of their opportunity to opt out" (Binmore et al., 1989 , footnote 2, page 757). In addition, the instructions to player 1 read (in part) as follows: "At certain times, your opponent can, if he/she wishes, 'opt out', and be paid a certain sum (initially £4.00); if he/she does this, you will receive nothing. You do not have any such outside option (Binmore et al., 1989 , Appendix 2, page 769)." In Binmore et al. (1991) , player 1 had a side value worth 4% of the pie. Thus, in this study player 1 was given (explicitly) the opportunity to opt out. We conjecture that one reason for the failure to fully replicate their previous results under the voluntary side values regime is not due to the different side values to player 1 of 0 vs 4% but rather to the players' perception (created by the instructions) that player 1 does not have an outside option in the first study whereas such an option existed in the second study. Weg and Zwick (1994) have shown that the presence of a null side value, a theoretically empty threat, can nonetheless have a significant attenuating effect on demands. 4 There is a refinement of this-Greenberg's (1990) optimistic standard of behavior, but in the bargaining contexts we are interested in, it coincides with SPE.
means that the game is approximated by ultimatum. Therefore, player 1 is expected to take 1 − s 2 , but will he/she? If the probability is low, then a 50-50 split of the remaining pie (considering the side values) makes sense. No player has an advantage in the determination of a split. In between, probabilities are interpolated monotonically. But this simple thought pattern approximates SPE predictions. No deep recursive thought, the Achilles' heel in the case of low or medium discounts, is needed to show an approximate rationality.
For V games with a high discount factor, time is less of an issue and the probability of termination has no effect if one is determined to bargain. This follows from the very V nature of the game. If one of the players has a better than half side value, he/she eventually opts for it. The probability of this eventuality is determined by the probability of accessing the side value. So, for example, if player 1 has a larger than half side value then her demand is expected to be higher if the probability of access is higher rather than lower. Again, one sees that simple approximate reasoning captures to a great extent the spirit of perfect equilibrium when time effects are small.
The results of experiments by Binmore et al. (1989 Binmore et al. ( , 1991 lend credibility to the hypothesis that enrichment of the bargaining paradigm has resulted in improved predictions. Their success may depend on the fact that approximate results with high discounts can be achieved without backward induction and perhaps even when one requires backward induction, the unlimited horizon setup provides an advantageous framework. Because the game structure shows an isomorphism between a subgame starting in the third period and the game as a whole, the period is only two in these games. This period coincides with the length of games where bargaining results support SPE better (Neelin et al., 1988) .
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The present study does away with the two confounding issues present in the studies of Binmore et al. and puts to the test the hypothesis that with high discounts, where side values are present, one can expect subjects to approximate SPE rationality. This hypothesis contrasts with the results of Weg et al. (1990) where side values were not available. The scenario is rich but is bounded away from extreme parameters, and the factors defining a bargaining game (method of termination, probability of breakdown, and discount rates) are separable. This wider scope should also shed some light on the role of conventional wisdom (STD and DMO) where SPE does not coincide with it.
METHOD
Subjects. Seventy-two male and female undergraduates from The Pennsylvania State University took part in the study, which included 12 sessions of six subjects each. Subjects were recruited through advertisements placed in the campus newspaper promising monetary reward contingent upon performance in a bargaining experiment. Each experimental session lasted approximately 150 minutes.
Design. Each session consisted of 72 bargaining games, described in Fig. 1 , divided into 24 parallel steps. The games in each step were played by the three dyads participating in the session. Steps 1 to 12 consisted of voluntary side value games (V games) and steps 13 to 24 of forced side value games (F games). All games shared the same pie size of $30, the same discount rate of 0.9 implemented as shrinkage, 6 and zero side value to player 2. The experimental setup was a 3 × 2 × 2 × 6 design. The first two factors define six combinations of three side values to player 1 ($3, $12, $24) and two probabilities of access (0.2 and 0.8) to these side values. Two sessions were devoted to each combination. The last two factors classify each of the 72 games played in a session as a V or F game and indicate the number of times (experience) the subject who played player 1 in the game held this role (from 1 to 6).
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Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory each subject was randomly assigned to either the left or the right side of a large room. Subjects read the instructions silently and were encouraged to ask clarification questions. 8 The experimenter then conducted a public play of two V games without actually exposing any particular offers. By asking players to accept or reject an offer and by announcing that the random event resulted in the availability or nonavailability of the side values (regardless of the actual fortune), subjects could explore all possible moves. Left subjects played against right subjects in each of the roles, player 1 and player 2 once, with the understanding that when the random event results in the availability of side values in F games, it must be taken by both players. Upon completion of the practice games, the subjects were each allocated to a cubicle in another room. The separate cubicles and the design of the session prevented subjects from identifying one another.
Dyad composition was varied systematically from game to game so that each of the three subjects on one side of the room played with each subject on the other side of the room exactly eight times in random order. Players in the right side cubicles always played against players in the left side cubicles. The former group of players assumed the role of player 1 in games 1-6 and 19-24 and player 2 in the other 12 games. Players were asked to write down their share of the agreement (or their side value if it was taken). This helped subjects to keep a record of their previous earnings.
All proposed allocations were submitted in writing in a "message form" and were delivered to the other player by the experimenter. The form contained spaces for:
(1) accepting or rejecting a proposal (by circling ACCEPT or REJECT), (2) opting-out, (3) counterproposing by specifying the amount a player demands for herself and the amount offered to her opponent.
Random access to the side values was realized by a wheel of fortune. 9 Games played in the same step shared the same random result. Options (2) or (3) above were filled only after the experimenter spun the wheel and were available only in the games with voluntary termination. In games with forced termination, option (2) was forced if the wheel so indicated. No communications were allowed except those indicated on the message forms.
Subjects were instructed to use a template to fill in the appropriate blocks in the message form corresponding to their decisions. The use of templates removed all association between subject's identity (her handwriting style) and her messages, thus securing anonymity. In order to motivate the subjects to bargain seriously, they were informed that at the end of the session, 3 of the 24 games would be chosen randomly and their payoff would equal the mean of their individual payoffs in these games. The mean payoff per subject was $15.00. Table I presents the experimental design and player 1's (first period) predicted share based on SPE and on the two focal point rules, STD and DMO. The use of both low and high probability of access to side values crossed with V and F games distinguishes SPE from the DMO and STD solutions as mentioned above.
RESULTS

First Period
Behavior. The left panel of Table II (period 1) presents the mean first period demands (of player 1) as a function of the three treatments (size of player 1's side value, probability of access to side values, and type of game played), the mean square error about the cells' means for each type of game, and the respective degrees of freedom. 10 In Table III (period 1) we present less aggregated statistics: a five point summary of the distribution of median 
, where p, s i , and δ are the probability to access side values, the side value to player i, and the discount rate. Then player 1's SPE payoff for a V game is min(max(a, b), max(c, d)) and for a F game it is d. "STD" stands for "split-the-difference" and "DMO" for "deal-me-out."
individual demands in the six games played in the role of player 1. Finally, the frequency distributions of first period demands regardless of experience are given in Fig. 2 . Additional information regarding the responses to these demands is also provided.
Our first task is to determine at what level to analyze first period demands. (The demands in periods 2 and 3 are analyzed in a subsequent subsection.) Because the design allows for the investigation of six levels of learning (experience), and because the type of game (V or F) is a within subject factor, we model player 1's first demands in each of the 12 games she assumed this role, as a 12-dimensional random vector. We shall assume that the probability distribution of this random variable has a nondegenerate covariance matrix. Hence every nonnull linear transformation of it has this property. This assumption is sufficient to allow for bootstrap hypotheses testing of the type explained in Appendix 2.
We first consider whether learning manifests itself differently in V games than in F games. The 12-dimensional random variable is reduced linearly into a 5-dimensional vector by an appropriate contrast matrix to reflect the interaction between experience (playing the same game six times) and type of game. No significant interaction was found (the Monte Carlo, based on 999 resampling from the data, shows that T 2 obs = 3.391 with the probability of this value or higher being 0.713 (T 2 obs = 3.391, p = 0.713)). In a similar manner we find, combining the V and F games, no effect for experience (T 2 obs = 4.882, p = 0.591). But another test of the differences between the six demands in V games and their corresponding F games shows that their mean is significantly different from the zero vector (T 2 obs = 59.820, p = 0.001). The mean first demand by player 1 in the F games is significantly higher than in the V games (see Table II , period 1). Not only is this result consistent with SPE predictions, but it has an intuitive basis as well. If player 2's side value is null, she is weaker when her chance to continue bargaining-her only course for personal gains-is limited by the possibility of forced termination. The fact that experience in playing the games has not affected demands in any significant manner allows for the aggregation of the first period demands that each subject placed in the six repetitions of the game. The rest of the analysis of first period demands is done, therefore, with respect to mean individual demands.
We now turn to testing several implications from SPE logic. SPE predicts the side values are irrelevant when the size of the side value to player 1 is less than about half the pie (because the discount is quite weak-δ = 0.90). To test this hypothesis we pursue a randomization approach combined with the logic leading to Tukey's studentized range test for paired comparisons between means. a Demands in period 2 are adjusted relative to a fixed pie of $30.00. An observation on a subject is the median demand in repeated play of a game.
Specifically, we assume that the different side values and probabilities of access are merely labels, having no effect on the mean demand. Because the subjects are randomized into conditions, the mean cells are those obtained by a random permutation of the given collections of 72 demands. As we are interested in four means (Table I, difference, 0.98 = (16.72−15.74, the difference between the highest and lowest means among cells 1-4), is 0.856, and no difference between the maximum and minimum demands can be discerned. Thus the hypothesis derived from SPE in this case is vindicated.
We conclude that the mean demand when side values pose theoretically irrelevant threats is unchanged regardless of the accessibility level of these options (probability). This result is consistent with those reported by Binmore et al. (1989 Binmore et al. ( , 1991 . Nevertheless, since the SPE predictions are close to equal split we are not confident that subjects actually followed SPE.
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Moreover, considering the deviations in the remaining cells regarding period 1, we are led to reject perfect adherence to SPE rationality. These deviations are in the direction of conservatism: player 1's actual demands are smaller than predicted. One may argue that although conservatism is found across the board, demands by player 1 still vary linearly with her side value for F games, as predicted by SPE, thereby providing partial support for SPE (see footnote to Table I ). The idea is that the discrepancy between SPE predictions and actual behavior can just be a matter of translation of the origin and/or differences in units.
To test linearity, the stochastically independent variables X 1 , X 2 , and X 3 (first period demands made under the three side values of $3, $12, and $24 in the forced termination games) were regressed on the side values. Since a polynomial of second degree is the theoretical choice (because a parabola can be fit perfectly through the three means), we can test whether the coefficient corresopnding to the square of the side value is zero. To test this hypothesis we apply a straight randomization test, with the same statistics used in standard regression analysis, again based on a sample of 999 permutations. The hypothesis was rejected for both probability treatments with p-values of 0.019 for the 0.2 case and 0.028 for the 0.8. Figure 3 , showing strict convexity of demands with side value, is thus real.
We note parenthetically that while significantly deviating from the SPE predictions, mean first period demands in F games with high probability of termination (cells 8, 10, and 12) are well fitted by the STD rule, similar to the Binmore et al. (1991) study. The cells' means of 17.47, 20.12, and 26.88 are not significantly different from the corresponding predicted allocations of 16.5, 21, and 27 based on this rule ( p > 0.99). This was determined by a randomization test with the statistic being the sum of squared deviations of the mean individual demands in each cell from their respective STD prediction. This evidence supports the argument that STD behavior is influenced by cues other than SPE rationality.
If SPE is neither an absolute predictor nor a slope predictor (for F games) of first period demands, can we accept it as a monotone predictor? In other words, can we accept the hypothesis that bargaining shares reflect some nondecreasing function of SPE predictions? Instead of sticking to exact predictions (or, for F games, some linear transformation of the predictions), subjects may perceive the relative strength of their positions and use this to guide their demands. This can be considered an operationalization of the rich environment hypothesis. In order to investigate this hypothesis, we computed the best monotone regression of the means on the SPE predictions. The explained variance by the monotone least squares is 1 − min φ cells (y − φ(x)) 2 / cells (y −ȳ) 2 , where x is the SPE predictor per cell (Table I) , y is the mean demand in cell,ȳ is the mean of y over cells, and φ is a generic name for nondecreasing real-valued function. By comparison, the linear explained variance, usually referred to as R 2 , is obtained if φ is permitted to vary only over linear functions. (See Kruskal, 1964 , for an algorithm.) The value obtained was 0.87 compared to the linear explained variance of only 0.60. This outcome supports the claim that behavior mimics a monotone transformation of SPE.
Of independent interest is the pattern of acceptance of first period demands. Table IV presents evidence of the cell structure of the accepted and rejected demands. Does game termination in the first period relate to size of side value and probability? To answer this question we scored each subject by the number of his or her accepted first period demands in playing the role of player 1 in the six repetitions of any F game and six repetitions of any V game. We then modeled the two scores obtained in this manner as random vector variables from six populations obtained from the classification of games into three sizes of player 1's side value and two probabilities of access. We consider main effects and interactionà la multivariate analysis of variance, but use permutation distributions for the determination of significance. The statistics used are the ratio of determinants of the sum of squares and cross products of the error when the effect in question is part of the model and when it is not. 12 Sampling of 999 observations from the randomization sampling distribution, assuming the null hypothesis of no relation between classification and the number of games ending in the first period, we found our statistics clearly not significant. Thus size and probability do not affect first period termination which means that demands are adjusted to probability and size of side value in a manner that preserves the rate of acceptance.
Whereas Ochs and Roth (1989) and Zwick et al. (1992) find that it is not profitable (and often a losing proposition) for player 1 to exploit her strategic advantage, the picture is less consistent in our study. Table V presents the correlations between first period demand and player 1's final payoff for the same game, by game type, side value, and probability of access. Our results resemble those obtained in these studies-the correlations 13 are in general zero or negative. A discrepancy from this rule is found when side value is $24. For high side value, exploiting strategic advantage seems to be profitable (except for game type V with probability 0.2).
The correlations in Table V attest to the degree to which player 2 accepts player 1's demand or eventually demands a rather small amount. Our data show that subjects consider a high side value a legitimate source of power to be exploited.
Behavior in Subgames.
Of the first 864 demands, 558 were accepted by player 2, 66 more games resulted in forced exit, and in 1 game (out of 77) player 2 opted out voluntarily. As a result, there were 239 games in which player 2 was in the position to place a demand. Recall that player 2 had no positive side value. Her avoidance of opting out is characteristic and serves to explain the contrasting behavior of player 1, who opts out even for tidbits. The middle panel of Table II presents the adjusted mean 14 (over subjects) of median player 2's demands in the second period classified by type of game, size of side value for player 1, and the probability of the side value accessibility. The median statistic is chosen to afford robust estimates for proper subgame behavior because some of the remaining subjects in this period might be rather special. The total reported number of games shrinks as each subject playing the role of player 2 is counted only once by the median aggregation. A five point distribution statistic is given in Table III (period 2) . It shows that the use of medians is in fact useful as protection against outliers. Here we do not follow the method used in the analysis for player 1's initial demand since we cannot verify statistically whether learning has taken place.
The analysis attests to significant differences between the means of the median demands among the experimental groups within each type of game. We employed randomization tests in which the medians of player 2's demands were permuted randomly among the six experimental conditions within each of the game types. The statistic in each case was the ratio of the sum of squared deviations from the general mean median demand regardless of experimental condition and the sum of squares deviations from the respective mean median demand induced by these conditions. This is the univariate version of the statistic used in our analysis of the termination in the first period and is, of course, monotonically related to the F statistic for the corresponding analysis of variance. Small values are significant. We find significance for both types of games ( p = 0.001 for V games and p = 0.045 for F games). We conclude that median second period demands do vary with size of side value to player 1 and probability of access. Hence our next paragraph is justified.
Let us investigate the more qualitative structure of Table II (middle panel) . The table shows a fairly close monotonic correspondence between observed and expected SPE demands. In fact, the monotonic explained variance is 0.80. Nevertheless, one can detect by eye the most troublesome cell. We follow the regression tradition in assuming one outlying cell and compute the monotonic explained variance coefficient repeatedly, each time deleting a single cell. The outcomes are 0. 81, 0.80, 0.80, 0.80, 0.80, 0.76, 0.80, 0.98, 0.80, 0.82, 0.80, and 0.64 . The serial position of each coefficient corresponds to the deleted cell in the standard order: 1, 2, 3, . . . , 12 (see Table I ). This computation seems to pinpoint the culprit. When player 2 faces her opponent whose side value is only $3 and when the probability of forced exit following a rejection is high (0.8), she does not dare to demand a high share.
15 Of course, with only four sample points in the cell, variations in the mean can be large. But one may still argue that the true mean for this cell is within 12.64 ± √ 12.753t 99.9% (36)/2 = 12.64 ± 4.84, which is well below the theoretically expected SPE value of $22.94.
Out of the 239 demands made by player 2 in the second period, 207 were at least in net value as large as the offer made to player 2 in period 1. This behavior shows that in the second period subjects usually did not contradict their own immediate past rejection. Now consider the second time player 1 could place a demand (period 3). Eighty such demands were recorded. The right-hand panel of Table II presents the means, mean square errors, and their degrees of freedom for the median adjusted demand of players 1 in the third period. Again, the median is chosen to yield robust estimates. Altogether 50 independent observations resulted after this collapsing. The table is quite sparse and two cells are empty due to lack of games lasting that long. In fact, these cells are of games whose probability of termination is 1 − 0.2 × 0.2 = 0.96, as they are of the forced exit type. This time the explained variance of the mean demand by nondecreasing least-squares is only 0.61. Although it cannot be determined from the table, all but 26 (i.e., over two-thirds) of player 1's second (adjusted) demands are strictly lower than his first. So a comparison between the left and right panels of Table II can be misleading because of a minority of over-demanding subjects. Because the game structure shows an isomorphism between a subgame starting in the third period and the game as a whole, we should expect similar patterns of demands between the two periods. The much depressed explained monotonic variance for the third period shows that this is not so.
Moreover, the counterdemands are counterrational. In only 18 of the total 80 cases are demands consistent with the last rejection, that is, demands which, if accepted, would make player 1 better off than capitulating to player 2's demand in the previous period. There is an additional, related indication against SPE. In the few times that player 1 had an opportunity to quit bargaining and consume her side value she did so 3 out of 9 times when her side value was only $3, 7 out of 13 times when this value was $12, and always when her side value was $24. Quitting when one's side value is less than about half of the pie contradicts SPE.
In judging behavior in the third period we should be aware of the very small and probably biased sample of subjects. For example, we should not be unduly influenced by the over-demanding subjects in cell 6 of Table I . With this caveat we are still quite impressed by this performance because we are comparing adjusted demands, where subjects had to be astute in making their demands relative to a two-period shrunk pie.
Adaptive Behavior. Following Zwick et al. (1992) , we examined current game first period demand in relation to previous game first period demand and the response made (by player 2) to the latter. We denote by d(g) the first period demand for game g. Recall that each subject played six consecutive games as player 1 in type V games and six consecutive games as player 1 in type F games. Therefore, ignoring the type of game, each subject contributed 10 pairs 1) ), where 1 < g ≤ 6 or 7 < g ≤ 12, giving altogether 720 pairs.
Table VI presents the frequencies of games classified by the sign of d(g) − d(g −1), previous game's response to first period demand, side value to player 1, and probability of its availability. The most striking outcome is that about 45% of all responses are unchanged as a result of player 2's response to the previous demand. This high proportion partly explains our conclusion above that no learning has occurred. A closer inspection of the data shows that 13 (18%) subjects ignored player 2's response to their previous demand and continued to demand the same share in at least 8 (out of 10) occasions. These are distributed as follows: three subjects in each of the cells 1 and 2, four in cell 3, and one in each of the other cells (see Table I ). This proportion of nonadaptive behavior is not unexpected. Similar proportions are reported by Ochs and Roth (1989) and Zwick et al. (1992) .
Define an adaptive (monotonic) response to be a strict increase of current game first period demand compared to the first period demand of the immediately preceding game when the latter is accepted and a strict decrease when it is rejected. Table VI shows that the sign of d(g) − d(g − 1), when it is not null, is a good predictor of the response to the immediately preceding game's first period demand. In fact, the table also presents the (partial) correlations between adaptivity (the sign of d(g) − d(g − 1)) and previous game's acceptance (conditioning on previous game first period demand). 16 One can see that these 
as a Function of Predecessor Game Demand Acceptance, a Probability, and Side Value 
correlations are rather high and only mildly affected by the conditioning. Thus, it cannot be claimed that the association is spurious, generated simply by possible extremeness of previous demands.
Also, it can be seen that only 20% of the responses, where
, are strictly nonadaptive, perhaps indicating spiteful behavior. Further analysis shows that this high level of adaptiveness (80%) is distributed evenly over individuals with an average individual score over the 3 × 2 between subject experimental structure, between 76 and 85%. These levels of adaptiveness are based on similar levels of individual demand variability 17 between 4.92 and 6.08 out of 10. We conclude that even by the individual level as opposed to the group level of analysis, apparent irrationality is rather low. 18 6. DISCUSSION Grounded mainly on first period demands, the best descriptor of demand behavior is a monotonic distortion of the SPE demands. In particular, first period demands in V games with small side values were the same and were independent of the probability of access. First period demands in F games were larger than those in V games. The high incidence of adaptive behavior when subjects vary their demands suggests that they search for an appropriate socially acceptable demand and do not necessarily follow a well defined strategy. We have also found vector whose components are identically 1. 17 An individual score of demand variability is
is the ordinal number for the games played by a subject. 18 Note also that at some points during a session a subject might try to ignore signals of previous player 2's response assuming that the current player 2 might be a different subject.
our results consistent with those of Binmore et al. (1989) and some of those reported by Binmore et al. (1991) . As did Binmore et al. (1991) , we found that subjects are sensitive to the interpretation of breakdown as voluntary vs forced, which accords with SPE rationality, but contrasts with "focal-fairness" theories. Unlike Binmore et al. (1991) , we have shown that subjects exhibit STD demands in cases where these are very different from SPE demands, thus giving grounds to a belief that a norm of splitting differences might be used independently of SPE cues. Even though our results do not support SPE predictions in absolute terms they are much more supportive of SPE rationality than found previously in infinite fixed discount factor bargaining games (Weg et al., 1990; Zwick et al., 1992) and in finite length games (e.g., Neelin et al., 1988; Ochs and Roth, 1989) .
Our data tend to supoprt the claim that richer environments, by providing outside opportunities in a meaningful manner, such as through the voluntary and forced termination mechanisms, induce subjects to approximate rational behavior. The rich environment hypothesis rests on the mental simplification provided by the existence and meaning of outside options. Playing SPE generates a path such that any deviation induces a subgame for which the utility of some SPE outcome to the deviating player does not exceed the outcome he or she would have obtained had there been no such deviation. Providing side values is nothing but enriching the basic pure bargaining game by subgames whose SPE solutions are relatively easy to delimit. In this way, games with outside options provide the bounds which restrict the players' reasonable demands. As an example, consider an F game in which the probability of access is 0.8 and side values are zero. Consistent with SPE considerations, the subjects, even with minimal foresight, can see that player 2 cannot attain more than approximately $6.00. Why then would player 1 offer more than that?
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That these considerations cannot guarantee approximate rational behavior in all circumstances is demonstrated by carefully choosing a test game. Consider a V game with parameters s 1 = 0, s 2 = 2 7
, p = 1, and δ = 0.9-a game played in Binmore et al. (1989) . The theory seems to be corroborated and player 1 obtains about half of the pie. Subjects ignore the side value to player 2. By bargaining, the subjects figure that player 2 can do better, which is what we are led to believe by SPE theory. But can they figure the pure bargaining value of every game? This, as we shall presently see, is a crucial question. Consider a slight change in this game. Introduce the equal discount rate of 1 6 instead of that stated above. If the players know the value of the pure bargaining game, they realize that player 1 has a tremendous advantage allowing player 2 only 1 7
. Hence player 2 is 19 We are assuming that subjects adhere approximately to expected value considerations. The troublesome part is that player 1 is too generous (see Table II ), albeit monotonically with his side value. Perhaps it is related to restrained demands shown in playing ultimatum. The equal split outcomes of Zwick et al. (1992) for high probability of termination might be interpreted as reflecting this very anomaly.
expected to be satisfied only with her higher side value of 2 7
. But we know from Weg et al. (1990) that in reality player 1 obtains only about half the pie in the pure bargaining game, which is a gross undervaluation of her strategic position. It follows that player 1 is expected to offer about half the pie to player 2. In this case the bound provided by the rich environment is relatively ineffective since the subjects falsely perceive the pure bargaining outcome to be higher.
Our experiment attests to the relative effectiveness of bargaining bounds provided by access to side values. Moreover, we conjecture that rational behavior in bargaining in finite horizons might also benefit from the introduction of side values. The generality of this conclusion can be determined by further experiments defined simultaneously by several parameters to allow the inclusion of extreme, and probably less intuitive, SPE predictions for the pure games underlying the chosen side value games.
APPENDIX 1: INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS
The following instructions were given to subjects in sessions in which Player A's side value is $3 and the probability of accessing the side value is 0.2. Similar instructions were given to the subjects in the other conditions. Bargaining Experiment. After you read these instructions, you will play two practice games to familiarize yourself with the procedure.
Our purpose in the present study is to investigate bargaining between two persons in situations resembling two-person bargaining in real life. In the situations that concern us two persons bargain over the division of a joint payoff with the knowledge that in certain circumstances either of them may opt out, but only one of them has a profitable outside option. Moreover, as is the case in real life, time is costly. Consequently, the worth of an agreement about the division of the joint payoff, if one is reached, or the worth of the outside option, if one is taken, diminishes with time.
The Bargaining Game. The experiment in which you'll take part simulates the bargaining situation outlined above as follows. All the persons in the room will be divided into pairs. Within each pair, one member will be assigned the role of Player A and the other Player B. Players A and B will bargain how to divide between themselves an initial payoff of $30.
At certain times Player A will be allowed to opt out. In this case A will get his/her profitable outside option and B will get nothing. At other times Player B will be allowed to opt out. In this case, B will get nothing and A will get his/her profitable outside option. Thus, no matter which player breaks the negotiations by opting out, the monetary outcome (a profitable outside option for A and $0 for B) is always the same.
The bargaining within each game will be conducted as follows. First, Player A will make a proposal how to divide the sum of $30 between A and B. The proposal must include two amounts that sum up to $30: the amount A demands for himself/herself; the amount A proposes to his/her partner.
If Player B accepts A's proposal, the bargaining will terminate with each player in the pair receiving his/her proposed share. But if Player B rejects A's offer, a random event will determine if B may opt out.
If Player B is allowed to opt out, B will have to choose one of two options: 1. Opt out. In this case Player B will be paid $0 for the game, and A will be paid $3.00. 2. Make a counterproposal. By rejecting A's offer, Player B has prolonged the game. This delay causes the joint payoff to shrink by 10%. Thus, Player B will have only $27 ($30 × 0.9 = $27) to divide between B and A.
If Player B is not given the option to opt out, option 1 above will not be available to him/her. Suppose Player B makes a counterproposal. Then Player A may either accept or reject it. If A accepts B's proposal, the bargaining game will terminate with each member of the pair receiving his/her proposed share. But if A rejects B's proposal, a random event will determine again if A may opt out.
If Player A is allowed to opt out, A will have to choose one of two options: 1. Opt out. In this case Player A will be paid $2.70 ($3.00 × 0.9 = $2.70) for the game, and B will be paid $0.
2. Make a counterproposal. By rejecting B's offer, Player A has prolonged the game by another unit of time. This delay causes the joint payoff to shrink by another 10%. Thus, Player A will have only $24.30 ($27 × 0.9 = $24.30) to divide between A and B.
This bargaining process will continue in the same way, with A and B alternating in making offers, until A and B reach a decision as to how to divide the current value of the joint payoff, or until one of the players chooses to opt out.
On your desk you can find a table presenting the joint payoff and the value of the outside option at each stage of the bargaining game, assuming that the bargaining reaches this stage. As described before, the joint payoff as well as the value of the outside option shrink by 10% each time an agreement is delayed.
Please look at the table now, and then continue to read the instructions.
The possibility of opting out will be determined randomly by a wheel of chance as described below.
The Bargaining Process (In More Detail). Player A makes the first proposal. In this case, A must fill in a Message Form identical to the one below.
Stage number: 1 Joint Payoff to be divided $30.00
A Proposes: A gets $ .
B gets $ .
Please check that the two amounts total $ 3 0 . 0 0 After A fills in the two amounts-the proposed shares of A and B-the form will be delivered to player B. Player B will then respond by circling either ACCEPT or REJECT on the Message Form.
ACCEPT terminates the game and credits both players with their agreed shares. If B circles REJECT, he/she must wait for the outcome of the random event to determine if he/she can opt out at this stage. To determine if B can opt out, the experimenter will spin the wheel of chance that you see in front of you. If the spinner lands on GREEN, player B can opt out. If the spinner lands on RED, player B cannot opt out.
Player B must fill in a Message Form identical to the one below. Please check that the two amounts total $ 2 7 . 0 0
If B decides not to opt out (provided the spinner lands on GREEN), or if the spinner lands on RED, A will get the Message Form. He/she will respond by circling either ACCEPT or REJECT. ACCEPT terminates the game and credits both players with their agreed shares. If A circles REJECT, he/she must wait for the outcome of the spinner to determine if he/she can opt out at this point.
Player A must fill in a Message Form identical to the one below. Please check that the two amounts total $ 2 4 . 3 0
The bargaining will continue in this way until either an agreement is reached or one of the bargainers opts out.
The probability that the spinner lands on GREEN (i.e., the probability that a player can opt out) is exactly one-fifth (0.2) (see the GREEN area on the wheel of chance). This probability will remain the same during the entire experiment.
At the end of the game we will collect the Message Forms. You will be assigned then a new bargaining partner for the next game, whose identity will remain unknown.
Your objective in this experiment is to make as much money as possible. At the end of the experiment, the experimenter will choose randomly three of the games that you have actually played. You will then be paid your average earnings in these three games.
Any questions?
We shall now go through two practice games together.
APPENDIX 2: STATISTICAL PREAMBLE
We try to avoid the normal distribution in our statistical tests. Two approaches are employed: randomization tests and bootstrap methodology. We prefer the former because of its simplicity and its reliance on conditions which are at our control as experimenters.
Randomization tests were introduced by Fisher (1953) , and a comprehensive account is given by Edgington (1980) . Their purpose is to test the hypothesis of existence of a certain stochastic relationship between two sets of variables-usually no relationship.
The template we shall use is the testing of the relationship between a random variable vector and the design matrix of an experiment. Suppose the experimental units were randomly assigned to the conditions and under the null hypothesis we assume that the observed values of the random vector are tags on experimental units. Any statistic, a function of these tags, would be a random variable derived from the randomization of units to the design conditions. Its distribution is often difficult to compute exactly, but one can resort to sampling from all the possible results of the randomization to get an estimate of the distribution of the statistic under the null hypothesis. Our standard sample size is 999. We count the number of cases which result in a statistic at least as extreme as that obtained in our experiment. (The latter is denoted by T obs .) Often one takes conventional statistics, like the F statistic, but any statistic which makes sense will do. It is important to realize that where one does not randomize one cannot use randomization tests. And this is exactly the case where we have repeated measures on the same subject in order to observe learning effects. Thus the timing is completely determined and not randomized. Therefore we resort to an alternative-the bootstrap method.
Bootstrapping is an approach to statistics introduced by Efron (1979) which substitutes computer simulation for mathematical derivation of sampling distributions. The scope of the theory is wide and we shall present only what we have used. A succinct description of this field can be found in Beran and Ducharme (1991) .
Suppose X , a k-dimensional random variable, has a distribution function F θ depending on a parameter θ ∈ where is some space. We wish to know the distribution, F n (t, θ), of a functional T n (X n , τ (θ)), where X n = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) is a random sample of size n from F θ and τ is a function on . Efron (1979) suggested to consider F n (t,θ n ) as an approximation F n (t, θ), whereθ n is a function of X n . This is called the bootstrap distribution of T n , which is given to us by the association ofθ n to Fθ n . The choice ofθ is very important to make the bootstrap a good approximation. Specializing Beran's (1984) results to our context it was shown that if the distribution of X is F, where F is assumed to have a regular covariance matrix , then the test statistic T n = (n S −1 n (X n − µ 0 ), (X n − µ 0 ) ) 1/2 can be used to test the (null) hypothesis µ = µ 0 with the help of its bootstrap distribution, instead of its real distribution, which is unknown. In this expression S n is the usual unbiased estimate of the covariance matrix,X n is the mean of the sample X n , and ·, · is an inner product. The previous context is mapped to the current one by identifying with the set of all k-dimensional distributions with a regular covariance matrix andθ is the empirical distribution of X derived from X n .
